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LAw-Du:s PRoCEss-VALIDITY oF STATE STATUTE RBTAKE LoYALTY OATH-A statute of Oklahoma1
required public employees to take an oath that, among other things, they were
not, for £ve years previous had not been, and would not become, affiliated with
an organization which advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means
or which had been determined by the United States Attorney General to be a
Communist front or subversive organization.2 A citizen and taxpayer sought to
enjoin payment of salaries to teachers at Oklahoma A. & M. College who had
not taken the oath. The teachers intervened and asserted, inter alia,3 that this
part of the required oath violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma limited the
proscribed organizations to those listed by the attorney general prior to the effective date of the statute, and upheld the constitutionality of the oath requirement. 4
However, the court refused to permit the teachers to take the oath as thus construed and also denied a petition for rehearing which included a plea that such
refusal was violative of due process. On appeal by the intervenors,5 held, the oath
requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The refusal to permit appellants to take the oath as interpreted constitutes a holding that knowledge of the
purposes of the proscribed organizations is not a factor under the Oklahoma statute. Thus, since membership in such organizations alone disqualifies, the statute
is an assertion of arbitrary power. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct.
215 (1952).
Since the end of World War II, as in past periods of national or international
stress, 6 laws have been passed on both the national and state level using test oaths
CoNsTITUllONAL

QUIRING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO

51 Okla. Stat. (1951) §§37.1 to 37.8.
oath is set out in full at pages 184-185 of the principal case.
8 The Oklahoma statute was attacked as being a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law,
an impairment of the obligation of the teachers' contracts, and a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This multiple attack is typical of the charges leveled
against such legislation. The charges under the Fourteenth Amendment have generally
been based upon an alleged deprivation of freedom of speech, belief and assembly and the
assertion of arbitrary power.
4 Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. (2d) 131 (1951).
5 The Court's footnote 2 at p. 186 of the principal case reads: ''The state officials
named as defendants in Updegraff's suit took the position in the state courts that the statute
was unconstitutional. Following a policy of the Oklahoma Attorney General not to appeal
from adverse decisions of the state supreme court, these defendants are here only because
they were made appellees by the appellant-intervenors."
6 Similar attempts to test or secure loyalty can be traced back to the time of Henry VIII
in England and to similar periods in continental countries. In this country, the earliest
important examples of such legislation are the Alien and Sedition Acts, passed shortly after
the Revolution. The latter part of the 1920's and the 1930's produced the well-known
criminal syndicalism acts which were passed upon by the Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ot. 625 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct.
641 (1927); and DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937). A fairly dispassionate discussion of the history of the test oath will be found in Koenigsberg and
Stavis, ''Test Oaths, Henry VIII to the American Bar Association," 11 I.Aw. GmLD RBv.
Ill (1951).
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or some other method to make loyalty to the present form of government a qualification for public employment. 7 Although such legislation has been attacked on
numerous grounds, the principal case is the first one since the war in which the
Supreme Court has found a measure of this kind unconstitutional. Heretofore
the majority opinions have taken the position that there is no right to public
employment on one's own terms8 and has upheld loyalty legislation on the basis
that it merely created reasonable terms of employment to protect and increase the
efficiency of public service.9 However, insofar as these laws have based disqualification upon affiliation with an organization whose purposes are deemed inimical
or dangerous to our form of government, the Court has pointed out that the
legislatures, or the courts by construction, have made knowledge of those purposes
an essential element. 10 Of the earlier cases, the closest parallel to the principal
case is Garner ·11. Board of Public W orks.U Three factors were significant in the
approval of the legislation in that case: (1) the California oath, like the Oklahoma oath, required an affirmation that one had not been affiliated with a proscribed group for the previous five years, but a statute passed seven years earlier
barred from employment persons who, subsequent to its enactment, became
associated with the same organizations covered by the later oath; (2) the oath
was interpreted as meaning affiliation with knowledge of organizational purposes;
and (3) the Court assumed that the California court would give the employees
an opportunity to take the oath as interpreted. In the instant case, on the other
hand, although the Oklahoma court did limit the proscribed organizations to
those listed by the attorney general as of the effective date of the statute, it refused to allow the teachers to take the oath as thus interpreted. Since the Supreme Court felt this refusal meant knowledge was not required by the Oklahoma statute, it was presented for the first time with the question whether mere
innocent association with such a group could be made a basis for disqualification.12 In holding that it could not, the Court reached a conclusion that should
7 Some of the postwar legislation is collected and discussed in 26 NOTRE DAMB LAw559 (1951); 5 VAND. L. REv. 822 (1952); Ober, "Communism Versus the Constitution: The Power to Protect Our Free Institutions," 34 A.B.A.J. 645 (1948); 7 LA.w. GOII.D
REv. 57 (1947).
8 The recent leading case upon the lack of a right to public employment is United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). Cases involving loyalty
legislation include Gamer v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951),
and Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952).
9 Gamer v. Board of Public Works, note 8 supra; Adler v. Board of Education, note 8
supra; cf. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565 (1951). This
approach has generally answered both the argument that such legislation is arbitrary and
that it is a deprivation of rights of free speech and assembly; see Adler v. Board of Education at 492, and cf. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70
S.Ct. 674 (1950), involving the non-Communist affidavit requirement of the Taft-Hartley
Act.
10 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
11 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951).
12 This is one phase of the often decried possibility of guilt by association. Two
earlier cases which touched this general problem were Whitney v. California, note 6 supra
and DeJonge v. Oregon, note 6 supra.
YER
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meet with quite general approval. The trend of postwar legislation, and the
apparent judicial acquiescence, has, with some justification, been severely criticized. For example, the judicial acquiescence itself18 and the apparent departure
from past decisions14 have been questioned. Further, it has been felt that test
oath legislation in particular, in view of its notorious history, violates at least the
spirit of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,15 and the very need for such
measures has been challenged.16 The position most often taken rests on a fear
that such legislation will provide the intended security, if at all, only at the
expense of suppressing the very freedoms it is designed to protect.17 Perhaps the
opinion in the instant case can be interpreted as meeting some of these criticisms
and as a slight recession from the earlier position of the Court.18 Justice Clark
does seem to show concern over the recent extent of loyalty legislation and its
threat to individual freedoms, and states that it would be improper to interpret
the earlier cases as meaning there is no constitutionally protected right to public
employment. 19 It is submitted, however, that such an interpretation would
exhibit undue optimism. Although the opinion examines the foundations of the
legislation somewhat more closely than did the earlier cases, the violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was found in the arbitrary assertion of legislative power
rather than in the abrogation of the First Amendment freedoms.20 Further, the
decision rests upon a feature that marks a clear distinction from the earlier cases,

18 36 MINN. L, REv. 961 (1952); 4 ALA. L. REv. 286 (1952); but see Ober, "Communism Versus the Constitution," 34 A.B.A.J. 645 (1948). Judicial acquiescence was also
prevalent during the earlier period of criminal syndicalism legislation; see, e.g., Gitlow v.
New York, note 6 supra. Of the recent cases, the one which is most reminiscent of the
Gitlow approach is American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, note 9 supra.
14 The greatest apparent departure appears in answering the argument that such legislation constitutes a bill of attainder or is ex post facto; see Justices Black and Burton, dissenting, in Garner v. Board of Public Works, note 8 supra, and 5 VAND, L. REv. 822 (1952).
15 26 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 559 (1951); 100 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 1244 (1952); 7
LAw. GmLD REv. 57 (1947). But see Ober, "Communism Versus the Constitution," 34
A.B.A.J. 645 (1948). See Justice Jackson, dissenting, in American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, note 9 supra; Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, in Gamer
v. Board of Public Works, note 8 supra; and Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting, in
Acller v. Board of Education, note 8 supra.
16 It is to be noted that such a consideration is primarily a matter for the legislature
and not the courts, except insofar as the balance struck between the power of the state to
meet a threat to its existence and the rights of the individual in a free society transcends
constitutional limitations. See, however, Justice Douglas and Black, dissenting, in Acller v.
Board of Education, note 8 supra.
17 This consideration is also a matter primarily for the legislature. See note 15 supra
and also 5 VAND. L. REv. 822 (1952); 51 CoL. L. REv. 130 (1951).
18 Justices Black, Burton and Frankfurter, who concurred in the opinion of the instant
case, and Justice Jackson, who took no part in the consideration of the case but has dissented
in the earlier cases, undoubteclly desire a more marked recession.
19 Justice Clark adds, however, in the principal case at 192, ''We need not pause to
consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that
constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
20 Compare Justice Black's concurring opinion in the principal case at 192.
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i.e., the retrospective character of the oath plus the fact that it disqualified a
person who had been innocently associated with a proscribed organization. There
is reason to believe the Court would not hesitate to reaffirm its holding in the
Garner case when and if it is presented with a similar statute.
James W. Callison, S.Ed.

